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1 Introduction
When state monopolies in railways and other network industries are liberalized, an
important issue is how to achieve eﬀective competition. One option is to abolish the
former state monopolist altogether, or at least to prevent him from being active in
the competitive part of the market. Even though this path has been pursued in the
railway industries of Sweden and the United Kingdom, it is not without perils, as
economies of scope between the network and operations are potentially important.
Not allowing the network operator to run trains may therefore result in eﬃciency
losses.
Guided by such considerations, the German railway reform that became eﬀec-
tive on January 1, 1994, attempted to strike a balance between the extremes of
a vertically integrated monopoly and a fully separated industry. DB Netz, a sub-
sidiary of Deutsche Bahn AG, the successor of the former state monopolist, is the
network owner. Other subsidiaries operate trains, namely DB Cargo (now Railion)
for freight, DB Reise und Touristik for long-haul passenger services and DB Regio
for short-haul passenger services. Potentially, however, these companies are subject
to competition. The institutions that are supposed to promote competition diﬀer
according to the kind of service. For freight and long-haul passenger transportation,
there is open access to the infrastructure, so that on-track competition is allowed in
principle.1 For regional passenger transportation, a totally diﬀerent approach has
been pursued. The reforms led to the possibility of using competition for the market
to procure railway services.2 Between 1994 and 2005, a total of 77 networks have
been procured using competitive bidding, amounting to approximately 20% of the
network.
Compared to countries such as the United Kingdom and Sweden that also in-
troduced competitive franchising, the unique feature of the German system is the
combination of two aspects:
1. A subsidiary of the former monopolist (DB Regio) is allowed to take part in
the franchise bidding.
2. Another subsidiary of the former monopolist (DB Netz) controls the network.
1In practice, competition in the long-haul passenger sector is very limited.
2Competition for the passenger market also plays a role in Sweden and the U.K. and to a much
lesser extent in the Netherlands.
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These features introduce a potentially important asymmetry which could be
advantageous for DB Regio. First, even though there is some degree of separation
between DB Netz and DB Regio, they both are part of the same holding. As DB
Netz has considerable discretion with respect to its choice of access charges and other
important strategic decisions such as investments into the quality of the network,
many observers fear that it uses this potential to discriminate against competitors.
Second, even though a few mostly minor railway lines were operated by a small
number of typically publicly owned companies, Deutsche Bahn was the owner of the
vast majority of lines at the outset of the reform. Thus, eﬀectively, DB Regio plays
the role of an incumbent in most procurement auctions, which could conceivably
provide it with an advantage compared to competitors.
Given the incumbency role of the former state monopolist and his control of the
network, it is not obvious that competition can be eﬀective. The paper therefore
uses the example of regional passenger services to discuss under which circumstances
competitive tendering can work iwhen a vertically integrated former state monopolist
faces potential entry in the downstream segment of the market, that is, in train
operations.
We use a data set consisting of all 77 tendering procedures for operations starting
between 1997 and 2007 to analyze under which circumstances competitors of the
dominant firm have cast successful bids. Thus, we use entry as a measure of eﬀective
competition. This is clearly not ideal — even potential entry might be enough to
discipline the incumbent. However, it would at least appear plausible that the
conditions fostering potential entry are similar to those fostering actual entry.
Our analysis exploits the heterogeneity in the set of competitively procured net-
works. For instance, the network length varied between 13 and 369 kilometers.
Similarly, the required train services ranged from 200,000 to 6,000,000 train kilome-
ters. The minimal contract length was 2 years, the maximum was 19 years. Some
networks were surrounded by lines that were run by DB Regio when franchising took
place; others were adjacent to lines that were already operated by other companies.
As we lay out in more detail in Section 3, intuition would suggest that these
characteristics should influence the success chances of potential entrants vis à vis DB
Regio. For instance, the former incumbent would appear to have better chances on
large networks because it is more experienced at operating complex structures. Our
probit analysis reveals that DB Regio is indeed much more likely to be the successful
bidder when the network is long. Another potentially important determinant of the
success chances is the time at which the auction took place. There are at least two
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reasons why one might expect potential entrants to become more successful over
time. First, there may be learning eﬀects. Increasing experience of entrants is likely
to increase their eﬃciency, so that they can cast more aggressive bids. Second, there
may be reputation eﬀects. Most tenders leave the agencies with some discretion as
to which bidder they want to choose.3 Firms that have had a chance to prove
their ability to deliver railway services successfully should have better chances to be
taken seriously by agencies than relatively unknown operators. Again, our analysis
confirms the intuition: In the early auctions DB Regio was more likely to win than
more recently.
Though the eﬀect is not significant, there also seems to be a tendency for the
former state monopolist to win bids for electrified lines more frequently than bids
for Diesel lines. This may reflect the fact that electrified lines are likely to involve
greater complementarities with both long-distance passenger transport and with the
network, which are both controlled by subsidiaries of Deutsche Bahn. Even though
the electrification of a line is not a design variable for the agency, this result is poten-
tially interesting from a policy perspective. It suggests that the apparent tendency
to subject relatively unattractive lines to competition which are typically operated
by Diesel trains may make some sense from the point of view of inducing competi-
tion. Suppose relatively unexperienced competitors find it hard to compete against
the incumbent on electrified lines. Suppose further that, contrary to what happened
in Germany, the early franchising competitions would have been for attractive elec-
trified lines rather than for relatively unattractive Diesel lines. Then entrants would
have had relatively small chances to win the bid. If instead the first lines to be
tendered have characteristics which increase the winning chances of entrants, then
these firms can gain expertise and reputation by operating such franchises which, in
the long term increases their chances to win franchises with characteristics that are
less favorable for them.
The remaining variables, for instance the length of the contract and the adjacency
to lines that are already operated by competitors of DB Regio, have no significant
eﬀect on entrants’ winning probabilities.
Understanding the issues that we analyze is potentially important because of
their normative implications. If entry is desired, how should competitive procure-
ment be designed? Should large chunks of the network be auctioned oﬀ in one piece?
3The description of the service is usually called “constructive” when it is very detailed and
“functional” when the requirements are formulated in more abstract terms, so that only broad
goals are specified.
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What is a reasable choice of contract length? Is competition promoted by focusing
the tenders on lines that are already operated by competitors? Should competition
be introduced gradually or for the entire network.
Our results suggest some very tentative conclusions, even though the answers to
these questions obviously depends on many aspects other than the eﬀects of design
on entry, so that a full welfare analysis of the optimal design of railway auctions is
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we believe that understanding the con-
ditions that are conducive to entry is an important ingredient of such an analysis.4
Perhaps the most definite conclusion is that large-scale auctions are problematic
because they tend to make entry more diﬃcult. This should obviously not be taken
as an argument for minimizing network size, because the size of the network influ-
ences the extent to which economies of scale can be exploited, no matter whether
the operator is DB Regio or one of its competitors. Also, transaction-cost consid-
erations may favor relatively large network sizes. Furthermore, our results provide
some (limited) support for a gradual introduction of competition, because this may
help competitors to gain experience and reputation. However, our results clearly
do not imply that there is a good reason why less than one third of the network
has been exposed to competition more than ten years after the reform. Finally, our
analysis suggests that other aspects of contractual design such as the length of the
contract can be chosen without considering their potential eﬀects on entry, because
such eﬀects do not seem to be important.
Also, it is cucial to note that our analysis is exclusively concerned with the
circumstances that foster entry, given that competitive procurement is used. We do
not make any attempt to show that competitive franchising is a desirable method of
allocating railway services. However, our empirical analysis in Lalive and Schmutzler
(2007) suggests that competitively procured lines indeed perform better than lines
where competitive mechanisms are not used.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some more institutional
details. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. In Section 4, we present the data. Section
5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
4This is true even if it is not entirely clear how much entry is desirable. In principle, even if
entrants never won a procurement auction, this would not necessarily be a bad sign. As long as
the bidding is suﬃciently aggressive that the incumbent is forced to provide attractive oﬀers to the
agencies, competition may already be working. However, the circumstances that induce entry are
clearly informative of the circumstances that induce aggressive bidding.
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2 Institutional Background
In this Section, we briefly describe the German railway reform, focussing on its
implications for regional passenger transportation and on the market development
in this sector.
2.1 The Railway Reform
Until the early nineteen nineties, the railway system in the two German states was
essentially in the hand of state monopolists.5 In West Germany, Deutsche Bundes-
bahn owned most of the infrastructure and, at the same time, was the dominant
operator for passenger and freight services. In addition, there were several minor
railroad companies (NE-Bahnen) which were typically also vertically integrated and
carried out freight and/or passenger transportation on small networks. In East
Germany, Deutsche Reichsbahn was the integrated operator of the railway system.
On January 1, 1994, a major railway reform became eﬀective.6 Apart from
creating Deutsche Bahn AG as a successor of Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche
Reichsbahn, the reform had several elements that were familiar from other countries.
First, though Deutsche Bahn AG is generally regarded as a vertically integrated
company, distinct sub-organisations were introduced at the upstream level (DB Netz
for the network and DB Station & Service for the stations) and the downstream level
(DB Regio for regional passenger transportation, DB Reise und Touristik for long-
distance passenger services andDB Cargo for freight). Thus, at least a move into the
direction of vertical separation was made.7 Second, while most of the infrastructure
remained in the hands of the former state monopolist, some degree of downstream
competition was introduced. For instance, with respect to passenger railway services,
the reforms led to the introduction of competition for the market.
5There is considerable overlap between this section and Section 2 in Lalive and Schmutzler
(2007).
6A summary of the major elements of the reform is Deutsche Bahn AG (1994).
7In 1999, this separation was taken one step further. Deutsche Bahn AG then became a holding
company, consisting of five corporations.
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2.2 Competitive Procurement of Passenger Services
More specifically, as a consequence of the railway reform, the Länder have created
agencies whose task it is to procure local passenger services.8 These agencies have
considerable freedom in the way that they procure services. At one extreme, they can
still negotiate directly with the incumbent supplier, without contacting any potential
competitors. At the other extreme, they can resort to open competitive bidding for
the market. The extent to which this possibility is used varies considerably across
agencies. Moreover, individual agencies use diﬀerent mechanisms to procure services
on diﬀerent lines within their sphere of influence, typically relying on competition in
a relatively small number of cases and using direct negotiations with the incumbent
more often.
In the simplest type of bidding procedure the agency specifies detailed require-
ments about the service that it expects. The specifications include the frequency of
service, the rolling stock, the prices charged to customers, etc. The contractors’ bids
are the subsidy levels required to carry out the expected services.9 The successful
bidder receives his required transfer and obtains the franchise for a period of typ-
ically 5-15 years. He then becomes the residual claimant for the operating profits
of the line (net contracts) or at least for any cost savings or overruns relative to
the desired transfer (gross contracts). It is important to note that the procurement
procedure is not always exclusively focused on the required transfer. Quite often,
it leaves some scope for the contractors to compete in other dimensions. As the
weighting of these dimensions is usually not clear ex ante, the allocation mechanism
is closer to a “beauty contest” than to multi-dimensional auction in the sense of Che
(1993) and Branco (1997).
2.3 The Firms in the Regional Passenger Market
As a result of the introduction of competition for the market, the market share of
DB Regio’s competitors has grown substantially though it is still fairly small. Only
24 of the 77 tenders were won by DB Regio, the subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn AG
that is active as a regional passenger train operating company. Thus, even though
8In most cases, there is one agency in each state. Some states have more than one agency,
however; for instance, there are nine agencies in the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen.
9In typical textbook treatments of competition for the market (Viscusi et al. 2000), the proce-
dure is slightly diﬀerent. Contractors do not bid the required subsidy. Instead, they bid the price
they want to charge to consumers and the lowest bid wins (Demsetz 1968).
7
the fraction of lines which were procured competitively is still fairly small, in those
instances where tendering took place, the competitors were successful quite often.
As a prerequisite for developing our hypotheses on the determinants of the en-
trants’ winning probabilities, it is important to recognize that the pool of com-
petitors consists of several types of firms. First, the above-mentioned pre-reform
NE-operators play an important role. These firms typically still own their old in-
frastructure, but they often have expanded their operations onto the network of
Deutsche Bahn where they are exclusively responsible for the provision of down-
stream services.10 Second, some entirely new companies have been formed, such as
the Prignitzer Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft (PEG) in the Eastern State of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern. Third, foreign firms have entered the market.11 Typically, they
have taken over independent local operators such as the venerable Württembergis-
che Eisenbahngesellschaft in South-West Germany (Connex) or the newly founded
Prignitzer Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft in the Eastern State of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
(Arriva). In other cases they entered directly on lines that were previously oper-
ated by DB Regio. Finally, some lines are operated by joint ventures between other
companies, in some cases including DB Regio.12
3 Hypotheses
We now develop the main hypotheses of the paper. Because of its experience as a
former state monopolist, DB Regio would appear to have comparative advantages in
the operation of relatively large networks.13 Other things equal, it would also appear
plausible that such networks have more interfaces with the remainingDB Regio lines.
One would therefore expect the ability of DB Regio to exploit complementarities
between the network under consideration and its remaining operations to be more
pronounced when the network is comparatively large. Therefore, the first hypothesis
appears plausible.
10Important examples of such companies are Südwestdeutsche Eisenbahngesellschaft (SWEG),
Hohenzollerische Landeseisenbahn (HzL) and Albtalbahn-Verkehrsgesellschaft (AVG) in Baden-
Württemberg or the Eisenbahn-Aktiengesellschaft Altona-Kaltenkirchen-Neumünster (AKN) in
Schleswig-Holstein.
11The main examples are Abellio, Arriva, Connex and Keolis.
12For instance, the Breisgau S-Bahn was founded jointly by SWEG and the Freiburger Verkehrs
AG, the municipal transportation firm in Freiburg. The Oberpfalzbahn in Northern Bavaria is a
cooperation between DB Regio and the Länderbahn.
13Here, we think of the size of a network as its length in terms of track kilometers.
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Hypothesis 1 Large networks are more likely to be won by DB Regio than small
networks.
Another potentially important source of variation in the franchise contracts con-
cerns their duration. Here, however, the argument is much less clear-cut. On the
one hand, agencies might be reluctant to give long-term contracts to firms with
which they have little experience, which would suggest a negative relation between
contract length and agency’s winning probabilities. On the other hand, DB Regio
has much less need to worry about the specificity of its investments into rolling
stock for short-term contracts. If it loses a line that it won in an earlier auction, it
has plenty of opportunities to use the rolling stock elsewhere in its network.14 The
following hypothesis should therefore be taken with a grain of salt:
Hypothesis 2 DB Regio is more likely to win contracts with a long duration.
Even though observers of the industry do not necessarily argue that the operation
of electrified lines requires much more technical know-how than for Diesel lines, there
are some conceivable reasons why DBRegio might be more likely to win on electrified
lines. First, complementarities between a regional network and the long-distance
network which is mostly electrified and operated by Deutsche Bahn are likely to be
larger if the regional network is electrified. Second, thanks to its close ties to DB
Netz, the greater infrastructure intensity of electrified lines should put DB Regio
into a more favorable position than its competitors. Again, there are conceivable
countereﬀects. For instance, to the extent that regional passenger trains and long-
distance trains are substitutes, DB Regio might be concerned about cannibalizing
the demand of DB Fernverkehr, the long-distance operator. This would suggest
that Deutsche Bahn as a whole might gain less from obtaining the franchise than
an independent operator would.
Thus, again, the following hypothesis is more tentative:
Hypothesis 3 Franchises with electrified lines are more likely to be won by DB
Regio than Diesel lines.
As the competitors of Deutsche Bahn had, at best, very limited experience in the
operation of passenger trains in the early post-reform years, one would expect that
14In states like Lower Saxony, where operators are obliged to use rolling stock from a pool
provided by the agency this argument is obviously less palatable. Also, there are auctions where
contractors are explicitly required to use new material; this obviously reduces the scope for re-using
rolling stock elsewhere.
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their chances of winning were initially very small. Over the years, the eﬃciency of
small firms relative to DB Regio is likely to have increased due to learning eﬀects.
Also, the new entrants have had a chance to build up a reputation as reliable part-
ners, so that agencies should be more willing to choose them. This leads to the next
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Auctions that took place shortly after the reform were more likely to
be won by DB Regio than auctions that took place more recently.
Finally, there would appear to be complementarities in the operation of adjacent
railway lines. For instance, if an operator is already present in the neighborhood of
the network that is put up for tender, he can easily run trains beyond the network
itself, which is likely to be regarded as an improvement in service quality. Also, the
exchange of vehicles between the network under consideration and the adjacent lines
is simplified. This, leads to the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 Competitors of DB Regio are more likely to win an auction if they
are already operating trains on adjacent lines.
Finally, Figure 1 shows that there are great diﬀerences in the extent to which the
diﬀerent states use competitive procurement mechanisms. While Schleswig-Holstein
has procured about 50% of the services competitively, there are several states where
this share is below 10%. These diﬀerences presumably reflect diﬀerences in state
politics to some extent. As one might expect, there is a weak positive correlation
between the percentage of competitively procured lines and the percentage of votes
for the liberal party (FDP) in the most recent state election. It would appear
possible that states that are more open for competitive procurement also tend to
favor the competitors of DB Regio.
Hypothesis 6 Competitors of DB Regio are more likely to win auctions in states
which have a higher inclination to use competitive procurement.
Even though this hypotheses seems plausible at first glance, a cautionary remark
is again in order. Suppose that states first expose those lines to competition where
they expect entrants to have particularly good chances. Then states that rely more
on competition will typically also put more unsuitable lines up for tender.15
15Also, it should be noted that there are several states with more than one agency, so that there
could we within-state heterogeneity in the propensity to expose lines to competition.
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4 Data
To test the hypotheses, we required information on all networks that have been put
up for tender since the railway reform took place. At the time we finished the data
collection, 77 such networks had been contracted out.
Apart from the obvious requirement that we have to know who won each auction,
we also needed information on the independent variables. Several of these variables
concern the contract itself. We compiled information on the total network length,
that is, the combined length of the lines in the package, the amount of services
required (measured in total train kilometers), the starting point of the contract
and its duration. We also used various geographical control variables, including
the population of the two largest cities in the network, the minimal distance from
a city with at least 100,000 inhabitants and the state in which the network lies.
Also, we needed information on whether the lines in the package are electrified.
Finally, we needed information about the total number of train kilometers procured
(competitively or not) in the diﬀerent states, so that we can construct a measure of
the intensity of competition in the respective state.
To our knowledge, there is no systematic collection of data on the liberalized
German railway sector that is publicly available. We therefore had to collect the
required information ourselves. Most of the information came from the homepages
of the agencies who carried out the franchising, supplemented in some cases by direct
inquiries.16 The information on the electrification status can be inferred easily from
maps that belong to railway timetables. The geographical information came from
oﬃcial sources (Bundesamt für Statistik).
The most diﬃcult variables to construct was the “intensity of competition” in
the diﬀerent states, that is, the willingness to use competitive mechanisms. The
diﬃculties arose because a considerable number of franchise networks lie in more
than one state. While we have data on the total amount of services (train kilometers)
required on each franchise network, the exact share of this amount for each state
is unknown to us. We could, however, calculate each state’s share of the length
of each franchise network (measured in kilometers). To calculate the intensity of
competition in each state, we then worked with the assumption that the share of each
state of the total services in the franchise area equals its share of the network length.
Using this approach and adding over all franchise areas, we could calculate the total
amount of services procured competitively in each state up to and including 2005.
16In addition, we used publications by Deutsche Bahn (2003, 2005).
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We divided this number by the total amount of services procured in the respective
state (competitively or non-competitively).
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Overview
In the following, we present our empirical results, both in the form of descriptive
statistics and of simple econometrics. The descriptive results are summarized in
Table 1. Table 2 presents the results of four variants of a probit estimation.
Model 1 contains only the variables relating directly to contractual design: the
frequency of service, the length of the network and the duration of the contracts.
The remaining models add further controls. Model 2 introduces controls concerning
the circumstances of the tendering procedure. Apart from time dummies for the
periods 2000-2003 and 2004-2007, we added an adjacency dummy (“Neighbor”)
which takes on a value of one whenever an NE-operator was present on a railway
line that borders the franchise area. Model 3 adds controls concerning the lines
under consideration and geography: Electrification, distance to the nearest city above
100,000 inhabitants, size of the two largest cities and a dummy variable for West
Germany. Model 4 adds the intensity of competition in the state under consideration.
Before we address the hypotheses directly, we point to some general observations
concerning the data set. Table 1 reveals that the procurement auctions display con-
siderable variation concerning important variables. The average contract duration
is 8.69 years, ranging from two to nineteen years. The average total network length
is 138.87 kilometers, ranging from 13 to 369 kilometers. The total number of train
kilometers per line kilometer provided during a year varies from 3,352 to 36,364
train kilometers, with a mean of 13,071. The average distance from the next city
with at least 100,000 kilometers is 9.7 kilometers. 16% of the contracts began in the
years 1997 to 1999; 45% in the years 2000 to 2003; the remaining 39% have starting
years 2004 to 2007.
Figure 2 provides separate information on the geographical distribution of com-
petitive procurement. This information gives the percentage of the entire network
within a state that has been procured competitively. The figure shows substantial
diﬀerences in the inclination of the agencies in the willingness to use competitive
franchising.
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5.2 Testing the Hypotheses
We now move towards Hypothesis 1 that concerns the role of network size. Table
1 suggests a clear result in this respect. The average length of networks won by
DB Regio was 171 kilometers, whereas the corresponding figure for the remaining
networks was 124 kilometers. The probit analysis confirms this impression. In
all four models, the length of the network size has a significant negative eﬀect.
For instance, an increase in the length of the line by one standard deviation (93.2
kilometers) reduces the probability that the entrant wins by approximately 0.14.
This is clearly a substantial eﬀect.
Result 1 DB Regio tended to win auctions of relatively long networks.
The evidence concerning contract length (Hypothesis 2) is much less clear-cut.
Table 1 shows that the average contract duration in the two subsamples is almost
identical, at 8.6 for the networks won by DB Regio and 8.7 for the lines won by
the competitors. Unsurprisingly therefore, the contractual length has no significant
positive eﬀect in any of the probit models.
Result 2 The duration of the contracts won by DB Regio was approximately iden-
tical to the duration of the contracts won by entrants.
In view of the theoretical ambiguities concerning the relation between contract
length and the relative success chances of the incumbent and the entrants, this
observation is not terribly disturbing. Nevertheless, it is possible that our approach
underestimates the tendency for DB Regio to win long-term contracts, because it
focuses exclusively on competitive procurement. The majority of services operated
by DB Regio are based on direct negotiations with the agencies. The resulting
contracts are typically of a long-term nature, with a duration of at least 10 years.17
Next, we consider the electrification variable. Though the theoretical arguments
were not entirely clear-cut, the arguments suggested a tendency for DB Regio to
have better chances on electrified lines. The descriptive analysis appears to support
the claim. 29% of the lines won byDB Regio were electrified whereas the correspond-
ing figure in the rest of the sample is only 22%, which confirms our expectations.
However, the result is not significant in any of the two models with an electrification
dummy.
17These long-term contracts have been criticized as preventing the introduction of competi-
tion, and they are also being regarded with suspicion by the European Commission (Stuttgarter
Nachrichten, 15.7.03).
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Result 3 DB Regio tended to win auctions of electrified lines more often than auc-
tions of non-electrified lines, but the eﬀect is not significant.
Next, we consider the role of time. Our earlier discussion suggested that more
recent auctions are more likely to be won by entrants. The evidence is consistent
with this conjecture. To see this, first consider Figure 2, which gives an overview
over the franchising process, providing both the total number of tenders and the
number of cases in which competitors of DB Regio won the auction for each year
between 1997 and 2007.18 The data suggest that the total number of auctions has
not changed in any systematic manner over the last years. There is however some
evidence that the share of franchises won by DB Regio was higher in early years than
it has been more recently. The probit estimation clearly supports this impression.
Compared to the earlier auctions, the probability that an entrant wins is higher for
contracts beginning between 2000 and 2003 and for contracts beginning 2004-2007.
Interestingly, however, the coeﬃcient for 2000-2003 is higher than for 2004-2007,
suggesting that whatever learning and reputation eﬀects might have improved the
position of entrants, these eﬀects are no longer relevant. Even so, there is clear
evidence for the following statement.
Result 4 DB Regio tended to win early auctions more often than in more recent
years
We also expected that the adjacency of the network to other lines operated
by competitors of DB Regio should have a clear positive eﬀect on the entrants’
chances of winning, because the firms that operate these lines should be able to
exploit complementarities if they win the network. However, there is, at best, a
weak tendency in this direction. The probability that an entrant wins is 0.547 when
an adjacent line is already operated by a competitor as opposed to 0.5 when this
is not the case; but the econometric analysis does not confirm this tendency. The
adjacency variable is insignificant in all models.
Result 5 The chances of entrants to win networks that were adjacent to lines al-
ready operated by competitors of DB Regio are only slightly higher than the chances
of winning other networks.
18Here the year obviously refers to the start of the franchise, not to the time at which the auction
took place.
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Finally, we move to the Hypothesis that pro-competition states are also likely to
favor entrants under competitive procurement. Figure 3 plots the intensity of com-
petition in each state, measured as described in Section 4, against the percentage of
franchises won by entrants.19 To repeat, we essentially chose the percentage of lines
that had been procured competitively by 2005 to measure a state’s inclination to
use competitive mechanisms. The results do not suggest a positive relation between
the two variables, thus casting doubt on the hypothesis that states who use compet-
itive franchising a lot tend to favor competitors of DB Regio, and vice versa. The
probit analysis (Model 4) does not change this impression, suggesting if anything a
negative relationship between the propensity to put lines to tender and the entrants’
winning chances.
Result 6 The entrants’ chances of winning franchises were not higher in states with
a high competitive intensity than elsewhere.
Without presenting the numerical results, we note that the conclusion is un-
aﬀected if we use the share of liberal votes rather than the percentage share of
competitively procured lines as an explanatory variables. If anything, there is a
tendency towards entrants winning less frequently in states with a high percentage
of FDP votes.
The remaining control variables that are of less direct economic interest seem to
be of mixed importance. The largest city on the lines where competitors won was
larger than in the group where DB Regio won, but on the other hand the lines in
the latter group tended to be less remote than those in the former group. None
of the eﬀects was significant, however, suggesting that states that use competitive
mechanisms a lot are not necessarily biased against DB Regio.
6 Summary
This paper analyzes under which circumstances entrants are likely to win bids to
operate regional passenger train services againstDB Regio, a subsidiary of the former
state monopolist. In summary, the results confirm the hypothesis that DB Regio is
19For franchises procured by more than one state, the winning probabilitites at the state level
were calculated using the weights described in Section 4. Thus, suppose in some state A their were
five tenders, one of which was carried out jointly with state B. Suppose entrants won one of the
auctions carried out only by state A and the auction that was carried out together with state B.
Suppose further that state A’s weight in the joint auction, calculated as above was 0.6. Then the
entrants’ probability of winning was 1.64.6 = 0.348.
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more likely to win large franchise areas quite convincingly. Also, the time eﬀects
are as expected, supporting the idea that learning and reputation play an important
role. Other plausible hypotheses are not confirmed. In particular, the length of the
contract, the adjacency to other NE-lines and the electrification variable do not have
significant eﬀects.
One possible reason for the fairly small number of clear results could be unob-
served heterogeneity. It is well known that there is substantial freedom in the design
of auctions that goes beyond the rudimentary distinctions captured by our variables
network size, network length and contract duration. We have already mentioned
that some auctions prescribe the requirements much more restrictively than others,
but the diﬀerence is not merely a matter of the extent of discretion for the firms.
Rather, the dimensions in which firms face flexibility vary between the diﬀerent auc-
tions. In some cases, operators can vary the service level above a certain minimal
bound; in other cases they can supply their own rolling stocks (possibly, but not
necessarily, including used material). In addition, there are other important distinc-
tions betweeen diﬀerent contractual arrangements, including, for instance, whether
net or gross contracts are used.20 Our data set does not contain information on
these potentially important variables; but exploring them would be interesting for
future research.
20With net contracts, the operator receives fare revenue, whereas with gross contracts this is not
the case.
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Figure 1: Competition Intensity Across German States
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Figure 3: Probability that entrant wins vs lines with competition
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All Contracts Entrant Wins Incumbent Wins
(1) (2) (3)
Entrant wins .688 1 0
Quality (Tkm / lkm) 13071.056 12985.789 13259.356
( 5778.62 ) ( 5808.213 ) ( 5832.264 )
Length (lkm) 138.87 124.17 171.333
( 93.291 ) ( 93.083 ) ( 87.017 )
Duration (years) 8.688 8.717 8.625
( 3.625 ) ( 3.707 ) ( 3.512 )
Neighbor .532 .547 .5
Contract starts 2000-2003 .455 .528 .292
Contract starts 2004-2007 .39 .396 .375
Electricity .247 .226 .292
Distance to city (km) 9.701 11.679 5.333
( 21.84 ) ( 24.823 ) ( 12.412 )
Pop. in largest city 520563.27 572367.21 406162.92
( 761240.75 ) ( 853376.759 ) ( 498502.895 )
Pop. in 2nd largest city 104604.42 103989.06 105963.33
( 120240.203 ) ( 132637.697 ) ( 89417.888 )
West Germany .74 .774 .667
Observations 77 53 24
Notes: Table reports mean. Standard deviation in parentheses.
2
Table 2: Probit Analysis of Determinants of Entrant Success
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quality (tkm / lkm) -0.055 -0.048 -0.039 -0.043
(0.98) (0.79) (0.60) (0.65)
Length (lkm) -0.140 -0.134 -0.127 -0.132
(2.33)** (2.12)** (1.80)* (1.85)*
Duration (years) 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.034
(0.70) (0.61) (0.58) (0.56)
Neighbor -0.030 -0.057 -0.075
(0.23) (0.41) (0.53)
Contract starts 2000-2003 0.405 0.397 0.420
(2.61)*** (2.55)** (2.63)***
Contract starts 2004-2007 0.345 0.319 0.345
(2.07)** (1.85)* (1.95)*
Electricity -0.128 -0.115
(0.86) (0.78)
Distance to city (km) 0.083 0.078
(1.01) (0.96)
Pop. in largest city 0.103 0.109
(1.38) (1.36)
Pop. in 2nd largest city 0.042 0.044
(0.58) (0.60)
West Germany 0.141 0.152
(0.91) (0.97)
Lines with competition (share) -0.341
(0.69)
Observations 77 77 77 77
Notes: Table gives effects on the probability that the entrant wins the contract of a change by 1 standard
deviation for continuous variables, and of a change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. tkm=train
kilometers, lkm=line kilometers. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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